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with most of his conclusions, I enjoyed the intellectual exclIange. And this itself is a cbaIlenge for
theology: to deal with the thought of others always with respect, even if not always with agreement

-FIdber RusIeI E. Smith, S.TD.
Director of Eth!('1ltinn
PopeJobnXXID Mediad-MonI
Research IUd M....tinn Ceoter
Boston

Moral Absolutes, Tradition,
Revision, and Truth
by John Finnis
The Catholic University of AmJ!rica Press, 1991, 113 pages.
This densely packed short work, representing the four MicbaeIJ. McGivney Lectures delivered at
the Pontifical John Paul n Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family in September 1988, does
essentially three things: 1) it clarifies the traditional meaning of "moral absolute" and distinguishes it
from recent counterfeits; 2) it points out the centra1ity of moral absolutes in the Catholic-Cbristian
tradition from its beginnings to the present day; and 3) it gives a strictly philosophical defence of the
moral truth of these exceptionless moral norms against coosequentia1ist moral theories in both their
secular and religious guises.

1. The Meaning of "MonI Absolute"
Debate and doubt about the existence and nature of absolute moral norms arose within the
Catholic community especially in the area of sexual morality but has spread from there to include
practically every other moral issue. Throughout the debate, the Church, to the consternation of
many, has continued to assert the truth of such absolutes, as is evidenced from the following
quotation from John Paul II's Address to Moral Theologians of November 12,1988:
By describing the contraceptive act as intrinsically illicit, Paul VI meant to teach that the
moral norm is such that it does not admit exceptions. No personal or social circumstance
could ever, can now, or will ever, render such an act lawful in itself. The existence of
particular norms regarding man's way of acting in the world, which are endowed with a
binding force that excludes always and in whatever situation the possibility of exceptions,
is a constant teaching of Tradition and of the Church's Magisterium, which cannot be
called in question by the Catholic theologian.l
Besides contraception one could list divorce, adultery, abortion, suicide, fornication, homosexual
sex, masturbation, lying, blasphemy, murder, genocide, indiscriminate bombing of civilian
populations, artificial insemination and the generation of babies outside the marital embrace as types
of acts judged to be intrinsically illicit at one time or another by the Church's Magisterium.
All of these norms pick out types of actions or possible objects of choice that can be described in a
morally neutral way. They then exclude choices of such acts from the moral agent's debberation and
action. The acts pointed to and proscnbed by such moral absolutes are said to be intrinsically wrong.
This means that they are always wrong, no matter what the circumstances and the motives. It does
not mean that they are by definition wrong. Some people think that when Aristotle asserts that "one
must always be wrong" or that "it is not possible .. . ever to be right" to commit adultery, murder or
theft,2 or when the Decalogue commands ''Thou shalt not kill or commit adultery or steal", that the
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wrongness of these ads is built into their very meaning. Acoording to that view, to say that murder,
for example, is always wrong is as trivially true as to say that a triangle is a three-sided figure. If
"murder" by definition meaDS "wrongful or unjust killing" (or, as some moral theologians would
have it, "killing without proportionate reason") then the norm that murder is wrong reduces to the
pitiable tautology that wrongful killing is always wrongl However, murder bas not been definied in
this way.lCbas been defined as the killing of the innocent In the same way, adultery bas been defined
simply as "sex by a married person outside marriage" and was "not specifkd as wrongful or
inordinate or uncbaste sex by a married person outside marriage - as sex without proportionate
reason" (Finnis, p. 11). Exceptions to these norms are logically posSIble but morally excluded.
The universality of such moral norms should also be distinguished from the universality implicit in
judgements of conscience that take into account "all the circumstances " As a matter of logic, if it is
right to do something under one set of circumstances, then it is always right to do that same
something in other relevantly simiIar circumstances. This is true whatever that something may be.
Logical consistency is a necessary pre-requisite of any coherent discourse, including moral discourse,
but it abstracts from particular moral truths.
Finally, the relevant exceptiooless moral norms must be distinguished from those norms, also
exceptiooless, which forbid acts whose description is such that the norms do not apply whenever
morally significant circumstances not mentioned in the norms occur. An example might be: It is
always wrong to kill someone to make money. Such a norm will not apply if circumstances are such
that killing someone to make money bad some further good consequences (let's say where the money
could be used to build hospitals that will save the lives of thousands of people who would otherwise
die).
Traditional norms pointed to types of acts that were universally (not just "virtually" or
"practically" always) proscnbed. When Pope John Paul n says that "No personal or socia1
circumstances could ever, can now, or will ever, render such an act [as contraception] lawful in itself"
he is saying not merely that we can't imagine or conceive such circumstances, but that the norms
exclude "the posSIbility of exceptions." Exceptions themselves are imposSIble, not merely their
subjective conceivability.
The opponents of such norms call them "material" or "physical" or "behavioural" absolutes. But
they are properly called "moral absolutes" or "specific moral absolutes", since the acts picked out by
moral absolutes are not defined in terms of behavior but "in terms of the acting person's object: what
that person chooses" (p. 38). The same physical behavior and causality can embody quite different
human ads (v.g. administering morphine may embody an intent to kill or an intent to alleviate pain)
and different physical behaviours and causalities can embody the same human act (v.g. one may
execute one's intent to kill someone by shooting him or by not supplying food). For purposes of
moral evaluation one must look not to physical behaviour and causality but "to the proposal,
combining envisaged end and selected means, which the acting person adopts (or may adopt) by
choice, the proposal which any relevant behaviour will express and carry out" (p. 40).
2. Moral Absolutes in auwaian Tradition

Finnis briefly traces the history of these norms through the Old Testament (the Decalogue), the
New Testament, the Apostolic Fathers, the Middle Ages, and the teachings of Paul VI and John Paul
n.This tradition attests to the Church's belief that the precepts of the second table of the Decalogue
are implications of the supreme principle of love of God and neighbour. They exclude options
inconsistent with love of self and neighbour. There is no question here of honoring rules above
values, since by adhering to the rules one respects the good of persons protected by them.
Finnis refutes the arguments of those who would dispute the existence of moral absolutes or the
authority of the Church to propose them infa1hbly. Many of these objections are due to a failure to
distinguish between what is chosen as end and means and what is voluntarily accepted as a side effect,
or to appreciate the moral significance of this distinction (pp. 70-74; 78-83). Others are due to a
failure to distinguish between affirmative moral norms which hold generally for the most part and
negative moral norms which hold always and everywhere without exception (See p. 90). Some
opponents of absolute moral norms take comfort in Aquinas's treatment of divine dispensations frOQl
the precepts of the Decalogue. Finnis robs them of this comfort (p. 91).
November, 1992

89

3. PbiIosopbicaI Defence of Moral AbeoIutes

This short work contains a mere outline of the moral theory that Finnis bas developed at greater
length in Natural Law and Natural Righls and Fundamentals ofEthics. Finnis argues that Catholic
proportionalists, while seeking to enlarge the moral focus by taking into account the concrete
situation, including circumstances and motives, inevitably narrow that focus just in order to make
proportionalist calculation and assessment even seem possible (pp. 16-20). In reality, "human reason
cannot possibly make a comparative assessment of ... all [the] different types and possible
instantiations of goods and bads, so as to arrive at a conclusion. . . [identifying] one of these options
as promising overall greater net good, or net lesser evil, than its alternative (p. 22). Since reason
cannot solve the question, one goes with one's feelings. This means that proportiona1ist reasoning is
mere rationalization of a judgement already taken on other grounds or no grounds at all. It is reason
at the service of desire.
I would like to end this review by pointing out a few difficulties in Finnis's account that, I think,
need to be addressed. On pp. 68-69 Finnis gives good advice about how to give non-arbitrary and
morally relevant descriptions of one's acts, more specificially of what one is doing as a means towards
some end or other. Finnis recognizes that one's description of what one is doing is as much subject to
mistakes and rationalization as is one's calculation and assessment of the consequences of what one is
doing. I am reminded of the newspaper cartoon depicting a man pointing a gun at a bank teller. The
man is obviously threatening the teller's life should she refuse to band over money. But the caption
bas the bankrobber say:
"I am instituting my own economic self-recovery program"!
This is a clear enough example of eliding the means into a good end, a frequent strategy of
rationalization. What about the proper description of what is going on when the state executes a duly
convicted murderer? Is capital punishment, as Germain Grisez thinks, a case of intentionally killing a
person as a means towards the common good of justice, or, is it, as Finnis thinks (clearly in
Fundamentals in Ethics, less clearly in the book under review) an instantiation of the good ofjustice
with the death of the criminal an unintended side effect? Here, it might appear to some that Finnis's
apparent desire to uphold the moral rightness of capital punishment may be influencing his
description of an act. It seems clear to me that capital punishment involves the intended death of the
criminal for whatever reason -retnbution or deterrence. Perhaps Finnis would reply that death
need not be any more intended here than it need be by someone who makes use of death-dealing
measures in an attempt to save his life from another person's assault Some would consider (wrongly,
I believe) the refusal to admit that self-defensive killing is necessarily intentional a bit of
rationalization just by itself. For these people, no doubt, the refusal to admit that capital punishment
is anything but intentional killing will seem most implausible. I wonder if Finnis thinks there is any
way of settling these disputes.
I believe that more work needs to be done as well on what Finnis et al call reflexive goods, that is,
the various kinds of intra- and inter-personal harmonies such as inner peace and friendship and
religion. Finnis thinks that "not all instantiations of these reflexive goods are morally good" (pp.
4243). For example, a choice that is in harmony with hostile feelings such as anger and hatred
towards others is morally wrong. This seems to imply that a morally bad choice in harmony with
feelings of anger and hatred can be a legitimate instantiation of the human good of inner peace. On
the other band, on p. 44 Finnis says that such a harmony is a "counterfeit of the basic good of inner
peace. . . because reason is being brought into line with feelings rather than feelings into harmony
with reason and with the intelligible goods which give reasOn its cOntent" This would seem to imply
that only those instantiations of reflexive goods that include morally good choices are instantiations
of real human goods. And, indeed, it is difficult to see how a reflexive good (which is not, to be sure,
identical with choice, since it is a harmonious whole of choice and desire) could be a genuine human
good, a reason for choosing, unless the choice it contained was morally good. There is a confusion
here, I believe, that needs to be cleared up.
If Finnis et al are right about the existence and nature of moral absolutes, and I think they are, it
becomes clear that moral casuistry becomes narrower in scope. There are some things not up for
grabs! (See pp. 20-24) Some acts are absolutely excluded. Basic human goods are protected from
intentional assault. At the same time, we are in some sense responsible for the foreseen, if
unintentional, evil side effect of our actions. We cannot be indifferent to that evil. We should not
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consider ourselves off the moral hook just because the evil is a side effect and not something directly
intended. And so great weight falls on the moral principles, such as the Golden Rule, which measure
our moral responsibility for the distnbution of the benefits and burdens which accompany everything
we do. Finnis briefly touches on this in a section of Chapter 3 that has to do with one's responsibility
for the side effects of one's actions, He admits. thaUQ apply $e Golden Rule "one must be able to
commensurate burdens and benefits as they affect oneself, in order to know what one considers too
great an evil to accept" (pp. 81-82). He adds immediately that the role of commensuration in
question here is quite unlike its function within a proportionalist analysis. In this, he echoes official
Catholic teaching on, v.g., euthanasia, which, on the one hand, rules out as always wrong the
intentional killing of the sick and dying, but, on the other hand, does not insist on the use or continued
use of treatments that carry "disproportionate burdens." Still, one would like to hear more about
how this limited commensuration is to be done. Is this something ultimately beyond rational analysis
and left to the "discernment" or "intuition" of people who, one at the very least hopes, are devoid of
any intent to prevent, damage or destroy basic human goods?
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Food/or the Journey,
Theological Foundations 0/ the
Catholic Health Care Ministry
by Juliana Casey, IBM
SL Louis: Catholic Health Association, 1991. pp. ix + 121.
The Catholic Health Care ministry in the United States is in some difficulty due to financial
pressures, staff, and competition within the industry. It is in an identity crisis, articulated by Cardinal
Bernardin as moving toward a mixed model of identity, increasingly dependent on those who are not
Catholic. (Origens, May 23, 1991, p 33). Those staffing these institutions once came primarily from
religious communities, groups which clearly have not been immune to the dearth of religious
vocations. The questions arise from the Catholic Health Care ministry: How do we survive? Do we
survive with a Catholic identity? What are the reasons for which we exist? What are the resources we
receive from the Catholic traditions to aid our survival?
Sr. Juliana Casey's small book looks to rally the troops to maintain a Catholic identity in the
institutions and the health care itself. She is less interested in the nitty gritty of administering and
financing these entities than in inspiring the health care givers to look beyond the pain, stress and
difficulties of their work to see the holiness of their work. While many find this support in the
wonders their work achieves or in the appreciation of those helped, "for those who serve in Catholic
health care, there is still another source of nourishment: the riches of Catholic theology" (p. 1). This
gentle journey through some basic themes of Catholic theology is directed to those working in and
administering the Catholic health care institutions. Not a scholarly book, it remains
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